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Abstract 
Many regard corruption to be detrimental to international trade. Some, however, think that 
corruption greases commerce in case of low-quality institutions. Others argue that arbitrary 
corruption is more damaging to trade than predictable corruption. This is the first paper to test 
these hypotheses empirically with trade-related measures of corruption. It finds that in 
general, corruption is detrimental to international trade. However, bribe paying may be 
beneficial in countries with very long waiting-times at the border or low-quality customs. 
Moreover, the nature of corruption matters: more uncertainty in advance about the bribe to be 
paid reduces trade. 
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‘If I am born again, I want to come back as a customs official.’ 
Anonymous Thai Businessman1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The New Institutional Economics has once again drawn the attention to the important 
role formal and informal institutions play in the functioning of an economy.  The formal 
institutions consist of legally enforceable rules like laws. They provide the legal framework 
within which economic agents operate. However, the favourable influence of a legal system 
on economic activity will only materialize if it is properly enforced and embedded in informal 
institutions: habits, unwritten rules of good conduct and the enforcement of law.2 In this 
context, corruption - defined as the misuse of public power for private benefit - refers to a 
state in which the informal institutions are in a very bad shape. Consequently, one would 
expect that countries characterized by a high level of corruption perform badly in many 
respects. Several empirical studies confirm that corruption is bad for economic growth 
(Mauro, 1995; Méndez & Sepúlveda, 2001; Campos, Lien & Pradhan, 1999), the inflow of 
foreign direct investment (Wei, 1997), and that it delays trade reform (Azfar and Lee, 2001). 
Various channels explain these detrimental effects of corruption. Firstly, corruption 
has a psychocentric effect; the government neglects alternative options based on realistic and 
rational grounds (Alatas, 1990, p. 128, p. 130). Secondly, the potentially most productive 
individuals will divert their talent to rent-seeking instead of useful productive activities. 
Thirdly, speed money evolves into necessary payments and then into extortionary fees, 
resulting in inefficiency (Klitgaard, 1988). Corruption often increases inefficiency (the 
amount of red tape) and consequently it is sand rather than grease (Bardhan, 1997, pp. 1322-
1323). Fourthly, firms with the right political connections (and thus those that are trusted by 
officials not to betray them) receive contracts. They are not necessarily the most efficient 
                                                 
1 Quote taken from Gatti (1999). 
2 See Hodgson (forthcoming) for a discussion on the difference between formal and informal rules. The 
definitions given in the text closely resemble those given by North in a letter to Hodgson (see the Appendix of 
Hodgson, forthcoming). North doesn’t explicitly take into account that the degree of enforcement can differ with 
respect to norms that in principle can be enforced legally. Here we regard the enforcement as part of the informal 
institutions.  
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(Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). Finally, high bidding is often the result of low (and thus 
cheap) quality levels.3  
 In contrast to the literature cited above some authors argue that in certain (second-
best) cases, corruption can have a positive influence; it ‘greases the wheels of commerce.’  
Lui (1985) shows that if bribery is allowed, speed money allows clients to avoid bureaucratic 
delays, and it can minimise waiting costs if clients have different opportunity costs of time. 
Another argument is that corruption allows supply and demand to operate efficiently, because 
under competitive bidding for government contracts, the most efficient firms can offer the 
highest bribes. Thus, the contract goes to the lowest-cost firm (Beck and Maher, 1986; 
Kaufmann, 1997; Lien, 1986). Without bribe paying, a less efficient firm may have been 
chosen (perhaps because of its familiarity). If, in this second-best world, there are pre-existing 
policy induced distortions, the additional distortions caused by corruption may well improve 
welfare (Leff, 1964, p. 11; Huntington, 1968, p. 386). To sum up, ‘bribes are viewed not only 
as reasonable but as enhancing efficiency in situations where red tape4 or state control of the 
economy may be strangling economic activity’ (Elliot, 1997, p. 186, emphasis added).  
 A limitation of this positive view on corruption is that it is based on various forms of 
second best worlds, so that it does not deliver guidelines for the best policies to follow. 
Another problem with this view is that it disregards enforceability problems. Because of the 
illegal nature of corrupt deals, a briber cannot go to court and demand compliance to the 
contract by the bribee. Due to this arbitrariness, bribees may renege on the understanding with 
the briber and demand additional payments (Bardhan, 1997, p. 1324; Boyco, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1995). The screening of potential partners to check whether they can be trusted 
becomes necessary. Search costs are very high, as open advertising for trustworthy partners is 
not possible (Lambsdorff, 2002). Even after screening, the security of transactions is limited. 
A briber will have to keep a firm eye on the bribee to see if he sticks to the deal. This leads up 
to substantial negotiation and monitoring costs. Even after a corrupt transaction is over, 
partners are ‘locked in’ to each other and they must fear being denounced or being forced to 
pay hush money (Lambsdorff, 2002).  
                                                 
3 An example often presented is that of road building. The maintenance of roads is expensive. Road-building 
firms that cut down on the necessary repairs can still win the contract if they offer bribes to the right officials. 
Consequently, an increase in corruption often results in a lower quality of the infrastructure. 
4 Often, an enormous quantity of rules written down is seen as red tape. However, red tape embraces that those 
regulations are (at least threatened to be) enforced. 
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 The nature of corruption can also influence the effect of corruption (Herrera & 
Rodriguez, 2003). It is important to make a distinction between well-organised and chaotic or 
arbitrary corruption (Mauro, 1998; Myint, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). If corruption is 
organised (or collusive), it is predictable. Businesspersons know in advance the size of bribes, 
who to bribe, and the service delivered to them. In contrast, in a chaotic, unorganised system 
of corruption, all is uncertain. Officials (operating on their own ‘islands’) do not know what 
others charge, leading to overcharging. The amount of bribe money necessary and the 
delivery of service by the official are uncertain to the briber. Traders who deal with least 
developed countries are in fact often uncertain about what to expect when dealing with 
customs (see Cunningham (1996), quoted by Finger and  Schuler (1999, p. 7). They will thus 
have to take additional measures such as taking a lot of cash money with them (in case they 
have to bribe many officials), devoting a lot of time to negotiations on the conditions of the 
illicit deal, and keeping a firm eye on the settlement of the deal. This of course is costly. Risk-
averse businesspersons may consequently choose not to do business at all in a country with 
such a system.  
 Summing up, in general corruption is regarded to be detrimental to economic 
performance. However, it could have positive effects in countries in which the formal and 
informal institutions are relatively bad. Then, bribes might serve as ‘lubricants’ in an 
otherwise sluggish economy. Moreover, the degree of predictability of corruption influences 
its effects. The more predictable the amounts to be paid and the services provided, the less 
detrimental the effects of corruption. Whether these hypotheses are true or not is an empirical 
issue, which this paper addresses. In particular, it investigates the influence of corruption on 
bilateral trade flows. The effects of corruption on trade flows are less widely investigated than 
those of corruption on growth. Moreover, recently a set of relatively good indicators of the 
quality of customs have become available, enabling us to proxy directly the degree of 
corruption at the border instead of relying on measures of corruption in general.  
Two papers provide some empirical analysis relevant for this question. The first is by 
Lambsdorff (1999). He claims that exports of some countries are positively associated with 
corruption levels in importing countries, in the sense that their market shares are higher in 
countries that are more corrupt. However, since Lambsdorff uses market shares in stead of 
trade flows, this result does not necessarily mean that these countries export more (in absolute 
levels) when corruption is higher, it could also be that the drop in their exports as a result of 
corruption is lower than the decline in exports from (most of) the other countries in 
Lambsdorff’s analysis. The second study is by De Groot et al. (2004) and investigates the 
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relationship between institutional qualities in general and trade, but not specifically at 
corruption, and certainly not at the sort of corruption that is directly relevant for trade, i.e. 
corruption in the customs service. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap and to provide 
evidence on the relationship between corruption and international trade.  
The setup of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we discuss corruption and its 
sources. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical analysis, whereas Section 4 gives some 
concluding remarks. 
   
II. CORRUPTION AND ITS CAUSES 
 
The most commonly used definition of corruption is ‘the misuse of public power for private 
benefit’ (or much alike). Public power is exercised by bureaucrats (in the context of 
international trade: customs officials) and by politicians. Misuse would be deviating from 
formal duties of a public role or not living up to informal rules (e.g. codes of conduct). In 
general, it amounts to following narrow interests at the expense of those of the general public 
(Lambsdorff, forthcoming). Clearly, this definition is not entirely satisfying, because what is 
considered the misuse of public power and thus corruption is subject to debate and may vary 
across cultures. But this argument should not be taken too far, as there is great consensus 
across cultures on the moral values concerning corrupt behaviour and the ambiguity only 
occurs at the ‘edge’ of a concept (i.e., the ‘core’ has a universal meaning). Indeed, ‘no concept 
in the social sciences can be defined so precisely as to cover all possible variations’ (Alatas, 
1990, p. 109). Moreover, ‘it is often the Westerner with ethnocentric prejudice, who supposes 
that a modern Asian or African society does not regard the act of bribery as shameful in the 
way Westerners regard it’ (Noonan, 1984, p. 702). 
In the context of international trade, corruption would most often take the form of 
bribery (as opposed to several other forms of corruption like embezzlement or fraud, which 
are not very relevant in such a context). Customs officials might misuse their public power for 
private benefit. Corrupt officials extract bribes from a client, who otherwise will not receive 
certain services, or will receive worse service. Bribes5 can be defined as ‘transaction[s] that 
provide the parties involved with undue payment (interpreted widely to include any property 
having financial and non-financial value) or other benefit or advantage’ (UNCTAD, 2001). In 
                                                 
5 Other known terms include ‘kickback,’ ‘pay-off,’ ‘baksheesh,’ ‘sweetener,’ or euphemistic terms such as 
‘commission’ and ‘speed money.’ 
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this context, the definition of Lambsdorff (2002) is also useful; corruption is ‘an illegal 
exchange between two partners, one side [the briber] paying a bribe, the other [the bribee] 
providing a corrupt service.’6 Naturally, there are some exchanges that are corrupt in a moral 
sense, but that are not illegal (or not prosecuted). But the difference between ‘moral’ and 
‘legal’ definitions of corruption is not very large (Noonan, 1984, p. 702).  
 What causes corruption? Four reasons for corruption are found in the literature. 
Firstly, liberal economists argue that the amount of intervention by the state in the form of 
regulations and restrictions matters (Bardhan, 1997; Mauro, 1998). These regulations may be 
unfavourable for businesses/traders, for instance because they require a lot of time or prevent 
access to profitable markets. Public officials that carry out such regulations have a monopoly 
in granting permissions, for instance for importing goods. If regulations reduce profit for 
traders, they might offer graft to get around them. In this case, customs officials can earn 
rents by deviating from standard procedures (Myint, 2000). Economic rents (or monopoly 
profits) arise when a person has something unique or special in his possession and is thus able 
to charge a greater than normal price for its use. The size of the rent is determined by the next 
best thing such a person can do. 
This brings us to the second reason for corruption. For the customs official, accepting 
the bribe (rent-seeking) may even be necessary because his wage is too low to feed his family. 
Tanzi (1998) terms this ‘corruption due to need.’  
Especially sociologists point at another cause, namely differing norms between 
societies. They would lead to varying levels of corruption across nations. Public officials in 
some cultures may not carry out ordinary duties without extra payments, which would be 
considered bribing in other cultures.7 Furthermore, the level of corruption can be path-
dependent, leading to different stable equilibrium levels of corruption (Bardhan, 1997; 
Chakrabarti, 2001; Mauro, 1998). If everyone is corrupt, it pays to be dishonest as well. If 
everybody else is honest, behaving truthful offers the highest returns. If ‘in the beginning’ 
most people are venal, it is likely that this situation is perpetuated because of natural 
increasing returns to rent-seeking (Andvig & Moene, 1990; Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993).  
                                                 
6 The client is certainly not always a victim of the official, rather they might collude, or the client himself is very 
active in offering bribes to get certain benefits (e.g. an import licence the briber is not entitled to).  
7 However, Alatas (1990) argues that these norms are not societal (e.g. supported by most of the people) but 
rather the norms of the homo venalis in power (and thus having much influence). 
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Finally, corruption is influenced by the discretionary powers granted to officials 
(Myint, 2000). Such powers are particularly strong if government regulations are vague, non-
transparent, cumbersome, and large in number. In addition, the less customs officials are held 
accountable for their actions (e.g. monitored by integer supervisors or stigmatised by the 
public), the better opportunities for demanding bribes are. To conclude, the level of corruption 
will rise with discretion and decrease with accountability (ceteris paribus applies to all effects 
above).  
 
 
III. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
1. The setup of the empirical tests 
As far as we know, all empirical studies on the relationship between international trade and 
the quality of institutions use the gravity model. In order to be able to compare our results 
with those found by others, we use the gravity model in this study as well. It is very 
successful in explaining bilateral trade flows, despite the fact that its theoretical underpinning 
has long been a problem. The Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian frameworks are less adequate 
as theoretical foundations. It is true that, amongst others, Deardoff (1998) shows that the 
Heckscher-Ohlin could provide a theoretical basis for the gravity model of bilateral trade, but 
the linking is complicated and perhaps far-stretched. The link with the new trade theory on the 
other hand is very direct (Mathur, 2000). According to this theory, consumers have a love for 
variety, and the number of varieties is positively related to a country’s GDP. Consequently, 
the more similar the countries are in their GDP, the larger is the volume of bilateral trade. 
 
2. Data used  
An extensive description of the data and its sources is provided in Appendix B. Appendix A 
contains a list of countries included in the sample. Here we give a brief description of the data 
only. The dependent variable consists of the logarithm of bilateral exports of total 
commodities for 2002.    
The independent variables are divided into three groups. All observations are for 2002, 
unless stated otherwise in Appendix B. The first group consists of the variables that are in the 
basic gravity equation. They are Gross Domestic Product in the importing country and in the 
 6
 exporting country, Gross Domestic Product per capita in the importing and in the exporting 
country, and measures of bilateral distance between the two countries concerned.  
The second group consists of explanatory variables that do not belong to the basic 
form of the equation, but are often regarded as important for bilateral trade. Essentially these 
are dummy variables indicating whether the two countries have a common border, a common 
language, a common coloniser, or a colonial link. The hypothesis is that bilateral trade is 
larger between countries that have these common characteristics.  
Finally, the third set of variables consists of the variables in which we are interested. 
They are measures of (a) the intensity of corruption in general, (b) the corruption directly 
related to international trade, and (c) the unpredictability of corruption. We use three indices 
for measuring the general level of corruption of a country. The first one is the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), issued by Transparency International. It ranges from 0 (highly 
corrupt) to 10 (almost clean). The other is the scores of countries on the control of corruption 
index, which ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance. 
These two measures of the seriousness of corruption in countries are very highly correlated 
(correlation coefficient of 0.92), indicating that there is great consensus amongst observers 
about levels of corruption. As we wrote in Section 2, the probability of corruption increases if 
civil servants have discretionary rights and are not corrected by superiors or independent 
supervisors. Scores of countries on the following question measure the extent of discretionary 
policy: ‘If a government agent acts against the rules, I can usually go to another official or to 
his superior and get the correct treatment without recourse to unofficial payments.’ Scores 
range from 1 (always) to 6 (never is there such a possibility). 
Three variables measure the extent of corruption and the quality of customs 
administration. The first one is an indicator for corruption of customs and is the frequency of 
payments to customs authorities. The scores range from 1 (always) to 6 (never). The other 
two measure the quality of customs authorities. The first is the numbers of days that it 
typically takes from the time the goods arrive in their point of entry (e.g. port or airport) until 
the time a trader can claim them from customs. The scores are in days. The last variable in 
this group gives an overall picture of the quality and efficiency of services delivered by the 
customs agency. Scores range from 1 (very good) to 6 (very bad).  
As a measure of the unpredictability of corruption, we use an indicator that measures 
whether businesspeople know in advance about how much ‘additional payment’ is required 
(i.e. the amount of money they need to pay). It ranges from 1 (always) to 6 (never). A second 
indicator included for this purpose measures how often businesspersons need to pay irregular 
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extra unofficial payments. It also ranges from 1 (always) to 6 (never). Finally, we include the 
countries’ standard deviation of scores on the Corruption Perception Index. It indicates 
differences in the values of the sources used. The greater the standard deviation is, the greater 
the differences between sources in perceptions of corruption in a country. In this sense, it 
might be an indicator for the arbitrariness of corruption.  
 
3. The level of corruption and international trade 
Before presenting the regressions, we briefly describe the treatment of missing observations. 
Unfortunately, the variables measuring the extent and unpredictability of corruption are not 
available for all countries for which we have date on bilateral trade flows. Reducing the 
number of observations to the lowest number for which observations are available would 
result in lower statistical power. In order to avoid this as much as possible, we use the 
procedure suggested by Cohen and Cohen (1975). The mean of the cases for which there are 
observations replaces the cases for which observations are lacking. The equations are 
extended with a dummy. This dummy is equal to one for those cases for which an observation 
was missing. This procedure does not affect the regression coefficient of the variables based 
on the cases for which information is present. Yet the cases with missing data contribute to 
the statistical power of the estimates (see Cohen and Cohen, 1975 for more details).  
In accordance with the procedure followed in all studies in this area, we use the 
gravity equation in the empirical analysis. The typical gravity equation is: 
 
0
ij
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ( )ij i j i j ij
ij ij ij ij i
E Y Y y y D
Border Comlang Comcol Colony Inst
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
= β +β  +β  +β  +β  +β  
+ β  +β  +β  +β  +β  + ε              (1) 
 
where i and j denote the importing and exporting country, respectively. Eij, the dependent 
variable, is total exports from j to i in 2002. The independent variables are, respectively: 
national income or GDP (Y), national income per capita (y), the distance between i and j (Dij), 
the dummy variables described above (Borderij, Comlangij, Comcolij and Colonyij) and the 
institutional variable(s) (Insti), which are the most important for the purpose of this paper. 
Insti differs in successive regressions. The last term, εij, is the error term and is assumed to be 
well-behaved. The relations are estimated by Least Squares where White’s procedure is used 
for deriving heterescedasticity-consistent standard errors.     
 
     <insert Table 1>  
 8
  
The first regression is the basic version found in many gravity analyses. It encompasses five 
predicting variables: the logs of importer’s and exporter’s GDP (representing market size) and 
GDP per capita (representing the level of economic development) respectively8 and the 
distance between the trading partners. The distance reflects transportation costs and other 
distance related costs. As can be seen (Table 1, column 1) all independent variables are highly 
significant with p-values of 0.000. The regression as a whole explains close to 60% of total 
bilateral exports (the adjusted R2 is 0.59). All variables have the expected sign; the richer the 
im- or exporting country, the more trade and the greater the distance between the two 
countries, the less they trade (generally speaking). The second regression includes several 
dummy variables that have proven to be effective controls for shared historical, cultural and 
political background. Again, all variables are significant at the 99% confidence level and have 
the right signs. Countries with a common background represented by these variables trade 
more with each other than countries that don’t share these characteristics.   
The third regression (Table 1, column 3) checks the results by De Groot et al. on the 
impact of corruption in general. In accordance with their findings, a better control of 
corruption (in both the importing and exporting country) leads to more bilateral trade. Income 
per capita is no longer significant (importing country) or has the wrong sign (exporting 
country). This can be attributed to multicollinearity problems; corrupt countries are also poor, 
see also Lambsdorff (1999), and the correlation between the log of GDP per capita in the 
importing country and this country’s control of corruption is high: 0.83. The control-of-
corruption variables become insignificant when we control for the common background, 
although they keep the right sign (Table 1, column 4). Hence, the results on the influence of 
corruption in general are not very robust. As a further check on the influence of corruption in 
general, we run a regression with the log of the CPI (Table 1, last column) as a proxy for 
corruption. Now the perception of corruption in the importing country is significant but that 
of the exporting country is not. Hence, based on these results, one cannot state anything with 
confidence on the effect of corruption in general on bilateral trade. Probably, results that are 
more conclusive are obtained if one uses variables that measure corruption related to 
international trade more directly.  
  
                                                 
8 We transformed several of the original variables to logs because they were not normally distributed. Failure to 
do so may lead to false outcomes.  
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   <insert Table 2> 
 
Three variables measure the level of corruption directly related to international trade in the 
importing country: the frequency of payments, the number of days to import, and an indicator 
of the quality of customs. The frequency of payments has a significant influence on bilateral 
trade and has the correct sign (Table 2, column 1).9  The more often bribes are paid, the lower 
trade is. In addition, the coefficients of the basic gravity model keep their expected sign and 
are all highly significant. The average waiting time at the border significantly reduces the 
volume of trade exported to a country (Table 2, column 2). The other coefficients remain 
significant. A lower quality of customs significantly reduces inward flows of trade (Table 2, 
column 3). All other coefficients remain significant. Hence, the results are indeed more robust 
if one uses measures of corruption directly related to customs. 
Since long waiting times and low quality affect trade negatively, will paying bribes 
change this? In order to test for this, we constructed two interaction variables. If these 
variables are significant, the effect of waiting times at the border or of quality of the customs 
depends on bribe paying. Corruption might then improve the situation, in line with the 
arguments of the proponents of the second view. Corruption may have positive effects, if 
frequent bribe paying makes the effect of long waiting times or low quality on trade less 
strong. The first interaction variable is between the frequency of paying bribes and the 
waiting time at the border.10 Its coefficient appears to be significant at the ten percent level 
only and the significance of the other two corruption variables is reduced (Table 2, column 4). 
Thus, bribe paying does have a weak influence on the relationship between long waiting times 
and trade. The other interaction variable is the product of the frequency of payments and 
quality of customs. This variable has no significant impact on trade either (Table 2, column 
5); bribe-paying does not reduce the effect of the quality of customs on trade in this sample.11
 
    <insert Table 3>  
 
                                                 
9 Keep in mind that the higher the score on this variable, the less frequently payments are made.  See the 
Appendix for more details.  
10 The log of (7 - FREQPAY) * NODIMP. This seems complicated, but the calculation is necessary to make 
interpretations free of problems. 
11 Changing the distance variable (e.g. from DIST to DISTWBIG) does not influence the results substantially. 
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 One could argue that the latter results are found because the sample consists of countries with 
both (very) good and bad institutions. An argument can be made that bribe-paying greases 
trade only in those countries that have bad institutions. We therefore make a distinction 
between countries with bad and those with good institutions. The division is based on the 
countries’ scores on the waiting time at the border and on the quality of customs respectively. 
Countries are considered to have weak institutions if it takes more than a week (score > 7) on 
average to import goods, or if the score on the quality of customs is larger than 3.25. No 
significant results for the corruption variables is found when the quality of customs is used for 
distinguishing countries with bad and good institutions from each other (Table 3, column 2).  
The results are markedly different from those of the entire sample when bad institutions are 
approximated by long waiting times at the border (Table 3, column 1). For the countries with 
bad institutions, the coefficient of the number of days to import is more than three times as 
high as the corresponding coefficient for the countries with good institutions. As such, this 
reduces the volume of trade. However, the highly significant coefficient of the interaction 
variable between the frequency to pay and the waiting time at the border indicates that bribe 
paying may ‘greases the wheels of commerce’. This result partly contradicts the claims made 
by Kaufmann and Wei (1999) that paying bribes does not result in faster clearance, but 
instead may even increase the time spent with bureaucrats. So, although in general corruption 
increases transaction costs and thus diminishes trade, in countries with bad institutions 
approximated by very long waiting times at the border, bribe-paying may generate beneficial 
effects.  
 
4. The nature of corruption and international trade 
As has been set out in Section 2, the nature of corruption is potentially important. Its 
predictability matters for investments (Campos et al., 1999), so it is plausible that exporters 
also care about it. Traders might do less business if they are uncertain about who to bribe (and 
how often) and the service delivered. To test the influence of uncertainty, we extend the 
original gravity equation with indicators for the arbitrariness of corruption. The first one 
measures whether firms know the amount of the payment (bribe) in advance (the more so, the 
lower the score). This variable has a significant negative coefficient (Table 4, column 1) 
indicating that more certainty in advance about the bribe to be paid implies more trade.  
 
    <insert Table 4>  
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The second indicator for the predictability of corruption measures the frequency of irregular 
additional payments. It is low if traders need to make repeated bribes for the same transaction 
(Lambsdorff, 2001). One would expect that a large number of irregular extra payments would 
pose severe restrictions to business doing. Surprisingly, this variable has a negative sign 
(Table 4, column 2), meaning that the less often repeated bribes are required the lower trade 
is. In other words, it may be so that paying irregular extra bribes increases trade. This could 
be due to the fact that although regular payments do not result in faster access, irregular 
payments act as speed money because these payments are extra, which may result in more 
work effort by officials. In their theoretical waiting costs model, Cudmore and Whalley 
(2003) show that this indeed can occur. After corruption is introduced, queuing costs diminish 
and exports increase. Thus, it seems that there is evidence for the first view: corruption can be 
beneficial (it could ‘grease the wheels of commerce’). However, is this evidence strong and 
convincing? Actually, it is not. The reason for this is that irregular additional payments are 
highly correlated with the certainty in advance about the amount to be paid; the simple 
correlation coefficient is 0.80. In other words, if one pays many irregular additional payments, 
the amount to be paid is more certain. Thus, it is likely that the indicator on irregular 
payments partly ‘measures’ the sureness of the size of bribes. Consequently, the grease 
money conclusion is at least questionable.12
Another indicator for the arbitrariness of corruption might be the standard deviation of 
the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This is a valid indicator for the arbitrariness of 
corruption if the variance of the CPI reflects the uncertainty among respondents about the true 
spread of bribes. However, this variance might also reflect heterogeneous conditions in a 
country or judgment difficulties on the side of respondents, so that the results should be 
interpreted with great care. It does not have any significant influence (Table 4, column 3).    
Theoretically, bribery occurs more frequently if businesspersons have lower effective 
recourse through government channels or managerial superiors (Herrera and Rodriguez, 
2003). In order to test this, we included in the regression the degree to which businesspersons 
say that they have recourse to other officials: so that they may avoid the corrupt. This 
indicator is significant and has the expected sign, namely negative (Table 4, column 4): if 
                                                 
12 It would be useful to test for the effects of the quality of the service delivered by customs officials after corrupt 
deals have been made. The World Business Environment Survey contains this question: ‘If a firm pays the 
required ‘additional payment’ the service is usually also delivered as agreed.’ Useful as this may seem to use in 
the analysis, there is a major problem. Namely, the effect is necessarily of a second order. First, the client pays a 
bribe, and then the quality of the service is perceived. The effect of paying a bribe cannot be filtered from the 
regression results and so these are unreliable. Thus, theoretically it is evident that better service results in more 
certainty and thus more trade, but this cannot be tested.    
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 recourse to another official is not possible (e.g. the customs official is a monopolist), this will 
hurt trade. 
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This paper shows that more robust results about the effects of corruption on bilateral trade are  
found if one uses measures of corruption at the border and of the quality of customs instead of 
corruption in general. The better the quality of the institutions of a country the more it trades 
with other countries. This result holds for a large group of developed and developing 
countries. Bribe paying appears to increase inward trade for countries with very bad 
institutions, indicated by the quality of customs and the number of days imported goods have 
to wait at the border. In such cases, bribes may serve as ‘lubricants’ in an otherwise sluggish 
economy. Finally, we found that trade is reduced the most if corruption is very chaotic, i.e. 
when traders are not sure about the amount of the bribes necessary and the service provided to 
them.  
A great advantage of our approach is that it uses indicators that measure the relevant 
items more specific than others do. Nevertheless, some weaknesses also pertain to this study, 
which may direct future research. First, the analysis is based on official trade statistics, which 
do not take into account the unofficial or underground economy. As Myint (2000) points out, 
there can be a lot of illegal and unrecorded trade of goods and services.  Corruption directly 
stimulates the underground economy (Johnson et al., 1998). Thus, the actual amount of trade 
may be higher than statistics indicate.  
Second, a cross-country analysis for one year has at least two limitations: it gives no 
information on long-term effects or on causality. Azfar and Lee (2001) argue that corruption 
may lead to many intensive restrictions. Corrupt officials benefit from the imposition of tariffs 
by extracting bribes, and can influence their governments, so that tariff determination 
becomes endogenous. Kaufmann (1997, p. 2) points at the enormous degree of discretion 
many politicians and bureaucrats can have, particularly in corrupt societies. This may lead to 
a mechanism whereby corruption feeds on itself. Often procedures are designed to maximise 
the number of steps and approvals to create as many opportunities as possible for negotiation 
between traders and customs officials. The ultimate goal of these complexities is often to 
provide a means of augmenting the low salaries of the officials (Myint 2000, p. 53).   
Another drawback of cross-country regressions refers to causality. Several authors 
claim that the causality between corruption and trade runs the opposite way. Openness in the 
form of more imports may also lead to lower corruption. This is because more imports result 
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in more competition in the product market, thereby reducing available rents and thus bribe-
taking (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Bonaglia, Braga de Macedo & Bussolo, 2001; Larrain & 
Tavares, 2000; Treisman, 2000; Wei, 2000). But the evidence is not undisputed. Azfar and 
Knack (2000) show that the results from these authors suffer from sample selection bias; 
highly corrupt small countries are not in the datasets.13 Azfar and Knack use other, more 
reliable (internal World Bank) corruption data, including more countries, to show that there is 
no convincing evidence that greater openness reduces corruption.14    
These comments suggest at least two ways for future research. The first is to take into 
account estimates of illegal cross-border transactions. By considering both official trade 
statistics and illegal transactions, one obtains a better impression of the actual costs of 
corruption. This might be of great relevance for highly corrupt countries. A second 
recommendation would be to make use of panel analysis in order to study dynamic effects, 
provided of course that reliable data are available for several periods and a large number of 
countries.   
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The data used in this paper cover a minimum of 58 countries. This minimum is determined by the availability 
of data on whether additional payments are required. Even the smallest set used contains small, badly governed 
countries. We, therefore think that thee data do not suffer from selection biases in the way Azfar and Knack 
describe.  
14 Gray and Sandholtz (2003) also relate import openness to corruption, but they use a composite index of 
openness (including also investment, travel, and communication measures). Hence, based on their findings, one 
cannot say much about the separate effect of import openness. 
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Appendix A: Countries included  
Afghanistan 
Albaniaa,b 
Algeria 
Andorra 
Angolaa 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentinaa,b 
Armenia 
Australiaa 
Austriaa 
Azerbaijana,b 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesha,b 
Barbados 
Belarusa,b 
Belgiuma 
Belizeb 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Boliviaa,b 
Bosnia and Herzegovinab 
Botswanaa,b 
Brazila,b 
Brunei 
Bulgariaa,b 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodiab 
Cameroona,b 
Canadaa,b 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Chilea,b 
Chinaa 
Colombiaa,b 
Comoros 
Congo 
Costa Ricaa,b 
Cote d'Ivoirea,b 
Croatiaa,b 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republica,b 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 
Denmarka
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republica,b 
East Timor 
Ecuadora,b 
Egypta,b 
El Salvadora.b 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estoniaa,b 
Ethiopiaa,b 
Fiji 
Finlanda 
Francea,b 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgiaa,b 
Germanya.b 
Ghanaa,b 
Greecea 
Grenada 
Guatemalaa,b 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haitia,b 
Hondurasa,b 
Hong Konga 
Hungarya,b 
Icelanda 
Indiaa,b 
Indonesiaa,b 
Iran 
Iraq 
Irelanda 
Israela 
Italya,b 
Jamaicaa 
Japana 
Jordana 
Kazakhstana,b 
Kenyaa,b 
Kiribati 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstanb 
Laos 
Latviaa 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuaniaa,b 
Luxembourga 
Macao 
Macedonia 
Madagascara,b 
Malawia,b 
Malaysiaa,b 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Martinique 
Mauritania 
Mauritiusa 
Mexicoa,b 
Micronesia 
Moldovab 
Mongolia 
Moroccoa 
Mozambique 
Namibiaa,b 
Nepal 
Netherlandsa 
New Zealanda 
Nicaraguaa,b 
Niger 
Nigeriaa,b 
North Korea 
Norwaya 
Oman 
Pakistana,b 
Panamaa,b 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguaya 
Perua,b 
Philippinesa,b 
Polanda,b 
Portugala,b 
Puerto Rico 
Qatar 
Romaniaa,b 
Russiaa,b 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegala,b 
Serbia and Montenegro 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singaporea,b 
Slovakiaa,b 
Sloveniaa,b 
Somalia 
South Africaa,b 
South Koreaa 
Spaina,b 
Sri Lankaa 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Swedena,b 
Switzerlanda 
Syria 
Tajikistan 
Tanzaniaa,b 
Thailanda 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad and Tobagoa,b 
Tunisiaa,b 
Turkeya,b 
Turkmenistan 
Ugandab 
Ukrainea,b 
United Arab Emiratesa 
United Kingdoma,b 
United Statesa,b 
Uruguaya,b 
Uzbekistana,b 
Vanuatu 
Venezuelaa,b 
Vietnama 
Yemen 
Zambiaa,b 
Zimbabwea,b
 
For all countries data on bilateral trade and concur are available. For countries indicated by an ‘a’ data on CPI 
and those indicated by a ‘b’ data on quality of customs are also available.    
 20
 Appendix B: Data sources   
 
B.1 Basic variables of  the gravity model 
. Bilateral exports of total commodities for the year 2002. Measured in dollars, Standard 
International Trade Classification, Revision 1. Source: COMTRADE database, issued by the 
United Nations Statistics Division.  
. importing country’s scores on Gross Domestic Product for the year 2002 (2003 was not 
available yet). Measured in constant 1995 dollars; Source: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators   
.  country scores on Gross Domestic Product per capita, idem; Source: idem  
.  exporting country’s scores on Gross Domestic Product, idem; Source: idem  
.  exporting country’s scores on Gross Domestic Product per capita, idem: Source: idem 
 
B.2 Additional variables of gravity model  
. the great circle distance between the most important cities or agglomerations (in terms of 
population) between a pair of countries. Measured in thousands of kilometres; Source Centre 
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). This data set draws on 
previous sources developed by Haveman and  Henderson.15
. the bilateral distance between the two biggest cities of a pair of countries (weighted16), idem; 
Source: idem 
. the great circle distance between the capitals of a pair of countries, idem; Source: idem 
. Common border: dummy variable, scores are 1 (countries share a common border) or 0 
(otherwise); Source: idem 
. Common language: dummy variable, scores are 1 (countries share a common language) or 0 
(otherwise); Source: idem. 
. Common coloniser:  dummy variable, scores are 1 (countries have had a common coloniser 
past 1945) or 0 (otherwise); Source: idem 
. Colonial link: dummy variable, scores are 1 (countries have ever had a colonial link) or 0 
(otherwise). Source: idem 
                                                 
15 Specifically, we deleted some countries, and added others. We also adjusted the common language dummy for 
some countries (e.g. Denmark), because we only wanted matching first languages. 
16 See http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distance/noticedist_en.pdf for the methodology and the technical 
description. 
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B.3 Measures of corruption   
In general  
. country scores on the Corruptions Perceptions Index 2002, ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) 
to 10 (almost clean); Source: Transparency International.17
. country scores on control of corruption in the year 2002, ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with 
higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. Source: The Governance Matters 
III indicators as published in Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) 18  
 
Corruption at the border  
. country scores on corruption―frequency of payments to customs authorities, answers to the 
question: ‘Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to public 
officials when dealing with customs/imports?’ Scores range from 1 (always) to 6 (never) 19; 
Source: The World Business Environment Survey (WBES), © The World Bank Group.20  
. country scores on number of days to import goods, answers to the question:  ‘If you import, 
how long does it typically take from the time your goods arrive in their point of entry (e.g. 
port, airport) until the time you can claim them from customs?’ Scores are in days21, Source: 
idem   
. country scores on quality of customs, answers to the question:  ‘Please rate the overall 
quality and efficiency of services delivered by the following public agencies or services – 
Customs Service/Agency’. Scores range from 1 (very good) to 6 (very bad); Source: idem.  
. country scores on corruption―known amount of additional payment, answers to the 
question: ‘Firms in my line of business usually know in advance about how much this 
‘additional payment’ is. This is true…’ Scores range from 1 (always) to 6 (never); Source: 
idem.  
                                                 
17 On http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2002/2002.08.28.cpi.en.html, a detailed description of 
the methodology can be obtained. We deleted Moldova and Taiwan, because these countries were not available 
in the UN COMTRADE database (see below). 
18 The data set can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002  
19 All scores with values ‘0’ or greater than 6 were transformed to ‘6’ (i.e. ‘never’). 
20 Research by Hellman et al. (2000) found no systematic biases in the data. The original data set can be obtained 
at http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/ic_ica_resources.htm  
21 All scores with the value ‘97’ (days) are missing values and were deleted from the data set. 
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 . country scores on corruption―common for firms to pay additional payments, answers to the 
question: ‘It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular 
‘additional payments’ to get things done. This is true…’.  Scores range from 1 (always) to 6 
(never); Source: idem  
. country scores on corruption―recourse to another government official, answers to the 
question: ‘If a government agent acts against the rules I can usually go to another official or to 
his superior and get the correct treatment without recourse to unofficial payments. This is 
true…’.  Scores range from 1 (always) to 6 (never). Source: idem.  
 
Statistics of some variables         
 
   Mean   Median Range  Min  Max 
 
GDP im/exporter 2.0 Bn  8.8 Bn  9.2 Bn  54.6 Mln 9.2 Bn  
GDP per capita 6,748.0  1,801.0 58,929.1 123.9  59,053.0 
im/exporter    
Distance  7.88  7.50  19.80  0.01  19.81  
Corruption   4.59  3.80  8.50  1.20  9.70 
Perceptions Index    
Frequency of  5.22  5.44  2.82  3.17  6.00 
payments 
Number of days 8.14  6.23  30.46  0.92  31.38  
to import  
Quality of   3.21  3.22  2.54  1.83  4.36 
customs 
Known amount 3.42  3.47  2.71  2.43  5.14  
of payments   
Additional  3.69 3.75  4.37  1.37  5.74  
payments required    
Recourse to  3.54  3.69  2.68  2.23  4.91  
another official        
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Some data on corruption variables as illustration: countries at various levels of quality 
 
    One S.D. < Mean  Mean    One S.D. > Mean 
 
Control of    Libya   Suriname  Oman 
Corruption 
Corruption   Bolivia, Cameroon,  Costa Rica, Jordan, Ireland  
Perceptions Index Ecuador, Haiti Mauritius, South  
Korea 
Frequency of  Azerbaijan   Bulgaria  France 
payments 
Number of days Hungary  Armenia  Ecuador 
to import  
Quality of   El Salvador  Romania  Ukraine 
customs 
Known amount El Salvador  Armenia  Malaysia  
of payments   
Additional  Colombia  Hungary  Belarus   
payments required    
Recourse to  Sweden  Canada  Lithuania  
another official        
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 Table 1 Bilateral trade in 2002: corruption in general   
 
   1  2  3  4  5 
 
Log GDP  0.698*** 0.725*** 0.701*** 0.726*** 0.700*** 
importer  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GDP per capita 0.085*** 0.100*** 0.029  0.077*** 0.146*** 
importer  (0.000) (0.000) (0.251) (0.003) (0.000) 
Log GDP  0.981*** 1.008*** 0.988*** 1.010*** 0.953*** 
exporter  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GDP per capita 0.059*** 0.106*** -0.050* 0.076*** 0.111*** 
exporter  (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) (0.012) (0.000) 
Distance  -0.209*** -0.185*** -0.209*** -0.185*** -0.188*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common border   1.726***   1.732*** 1.711*** 
     (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Common language    0.566***   0.557*** 0.567*** 
     (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Common coloniser   1.326***   1.325*** 1.382*** 
     (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Colonial link    0.718***   0.707*** 0.802*** 
     (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Control of        
corruption  
. by importer      0.098*** 0.038 
       (0.006)  (0.296) 
. by exporter      0.166*** 0.045 
       (0.000) (0.243) 
Log Corruption       
Perceptions Index  
. of importer          -0.209*** 
           (0.001) 
. of exporter          -0.006 
           (0.935) 
Dummy log Corruption       
Perceptions Index  
. of importer          -0.168*** 
           (0.003) 
. of exporter          -0.650*** 
           (0.000) 
        
Adjusted R2  0.59  0.61  0.59  0.61  0.62 
N. of observations 12541  11813  12541  11813  11813 
F-statistic  3555.31 2082.59 2548.57 1704.24 1469.91 
 
 
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant terms are not 
shown in the table. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity by White’s procedure. ***: significant at 
the 99% confidence level **: significant at the 95% confidence level  
*: significant at the 90% confidence level. 
 
 25
 
  
Table 2 Bilateral trade in 2002: corruption at the border, entire sample      
 
   1  2  3  4  5 
 
Log GDP   0.724*** 0.723*** 0.725*** 0.727***  0.728*** 
importer  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GDP per capita 0.089*** 0.078*** 0.086*** 0.077*** 0.083*** 
importer  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GDP   1.008*** 1.008*** 1.008*** 1.008*** 1.008*** 
exporter  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GDP per capita 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 
exporter  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Distance  -0.185*** -0.184*** -0.185*** -0.184*** -0.185*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common border 1.715*** 1.720*** 1.733*** 1.710*** 1.721*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common language 0.566*** 0.583*** 0.555*** 0.592*** 0.561*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Common coloniser 1.339*** 1.336*** 1.330*** 1.342*** 1.341*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Colonial link  0.705*** 0.669*** 0.699*** 0.683*** 0.708*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Frequency of   0.091**     0.399*  0.327* 
payments  (0.031)     (0.057) (0.089) 
Dummy frequency -0.014      -0.041  -0.030 
payments   (0.737)     (0.680) (0.765) 
Log number of   -0.138***   -0.970** 
days to import    (0.000)   (0.028) 
Dummy number of   -0.031    0.025 
days to import    (0.480)   (0.798) 
Quality of      -0.170***   -0.354** 
customs      (0.001)   (0.016) 
Dummy quality     -0.012    -0.027 
customs       (0.770)   (0.783) 
Log interaction       0.816*   
frequency & days        (0.057) 
Log interaction         -0.581 
frequency & quality         (0.132) 
         
Adjusted R2  0.61  0.61  0.61  0.61  0.61 
N. of observations 11813  11813  11813  11813  11813  
F-statistic  1704.78 1706.97 1706.27 1341.50 1340.92 
 
 
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant terms are not 
shown in the table. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity by White’s procedure. ***: significant at 
the 99% confidence level **: significant at the 95% confidence level  
*: significant at the 90% confidence level. 
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 Table 3 Bilateral trade in 2002: regressions with dummies for countries with (relatively) good or bad institutions  
 
      1  2 
 
Log GDP      0.716***  0.702*** 
importer     (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GDP per capita    -0.058  0.049 
importer      (0.179) (0.202) 
Log GDP      1.037*** 1.036*** 
exporter     (0.000) (0.000) 
Log GDP per capita    0.104*** 0.103*** 
exporter     (0.000) (0.1000)  
Distance     -0.181*** -0.178***  
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Common border     1.776*** 1.783*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Common language    0.758*** 0.667*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Common coloniser    0.943*** 0.959*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Colonial link     0.526*** 0.596** 
      (0.000) (0.001) 
Frequency of payments   0.515*  0.297 
x dummy for good institutions  (0.107) (0.302) 
Frequency of payments   0.673** 0.308 
x dummy for bad institutions   (0.033) (0.198) 
Log number of days to import  -0.808 
x dummy for good institutions   (0.187) 
Log number of days to import  -2.611*** 
x dummy for bad institutions    (0.002) 
Quality of customs x dummy     0.109 
for good institutions      (0.685) 
Quality of customs x dummy     -0.264 
for bad  institutions      (0.195) 
Log interaction frequency & days  0.539   
dummy for good institutions   (0.351) 
Log interaction frequency & days  1.743**   
x dummy for bad institutions   (0.019) 
Log interaction frequency & quality    0.024 
x dummy for good institutions    (0.966) 
Log interaction frequency & quality    0.594 
x dummy for bad institutions     (0.264) 
     
Adjusted R2     0.63  0.63 
N. of observations    5556  5556  
F-statistic     626.28  621.66 
 
 
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant terms are not 
shown in the table. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity by White’s procedure. ***: significant at 
the 99% confidence level **: significant at the 95% confidence level:  
* significant at the 90% confidence level. 
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 Table 4 Bilateral trade in 2002:  the unpredictability of corruption, entire sample       
 
   1  2  3  4 
 
Log GDP  0.717*** 0.721*** 0.691*** 0.718***   
importer  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Log GDP per capita 0.116*** 0.110*** 0.104*** 0.102***  
importer  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Log GDP   1.009*** 1.009*** 1.009*** 1.009***   
exporter  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Log GDP per capita 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.105***  
exporter  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Distance  -0.187*** -0.188*** -0.186*** -0.186***  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Common border 1.688*** 1.684*** 1.713*** 1.700***  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Common language 0.557*** 0.557*** 0.561*** 0.562***  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Common coloniser 1.356*** 1.360*** 1.330*** 1.353***  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Colonial link  0.767*** 0.746*** 0.736*** 0.725***   
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Known amount -0.188*** 
of payments  (0.000) 
Dummy known  -0.117***  
amount of payments (0.004) 
Additional    -0.140*** 
payments required   (0.000) 
Dummy of additional   -0.127*** 
payments required   (0.002) 
Standard deviation     -0.055 
of the CPI      (0.330) 
Dummy of standard      -0.261*** 
deviation of the CPI     (0.000) 
Recourse to        -0.112*** 
another official       (0.007) 
Dummy of recourse       -0.122*** 
to another official       (0.002) 
       
         
Adjusted R2  0.61  0.61  0.61  0.61     
N. of observations 11813  11813  11813  11813     
F-statistic  1710.10 1710.70 1709.87 1707.45 
 
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Constant terms are not 
shown in the table. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity by White’s procedure .***: significant at 
the 99% confidence level **: significant at the 95% confidence level  
*: significant at the 90% confidence level. 
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